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This article addresses the question of when and for what purpose Muslims will
act collectively in the political arena. The impact of religious identity salience,
goal framing, and normative constraints on political mobilization was examined
in two Muslim communities with different group positions in Dutch society. Both
Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims expressed their willingness to take
normative or nonnormative political action to promote religious (“defend Islam”),
ethnic (“help homeland”), or superordinate group goals (“protect human rights”).
When their Muslim identity was made salient, Moroccan Muslims were more
ready to take normative action to promote religious goals and also more likely
to engage in nonnormative action. In contrast, Turkish Muslims were less willing
to take action when their Muslim identity was salient, except for superordinate
human rights goals. Our findings caution against simplistic assumptions about all
Muslims by contextualizing the ways in which religion plays out in the political
arena.
The much-publicized Van Gogh murder by a Muslim radical in Amsterdam
in 2004 caused a public outcry against Islam and marked a low point in the already
tenuous public acceptance of Dutch Muslims. Since the late 1990s, public opinion
surveys show widespread resistance against the presence of Muslims in Dutch
society, which has become almost consensual in most recent surveys (Phalet &
Gijsberts, 2007; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Muslims are singled out by
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critics of multiculturalism as prototypical outsiders. Islam is presented as incom-
patible with civic norms and values and as a barrier to sociocultural integration in
Dutch society. What are the repercussions of this public climate for the political
mobilization of Dutch Muslims? Although the presence of Muslim minorities in
many Western societies is highly politicized and conflict ridden (Fleischmann &
Phalet, in press), little is known about the group processes connecting the religious
identity of Muslims to political action. From the viewpoint of Muslim minorities,
their religious group membership offers a group-based perspective that forms the
basis of political mobilization (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). This article
examines how the religious identities of Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch
Muslims play out in the political domain.
Of the many social–psychological studies on collective action (Van Zomeren,
Postmes, & Spears, 2008), very few focus on religious groups and on Muslim
minorities in particular. The main aim of this research is to investigate the impact
of Muslim identity salience on political action tendencies in two Muslim minorities
with different group positions in the Dutch intergroup hierarchy. Specifically, the
research examines the foregrounding of religious identity in comparison with
ethnic identity and in relation to political action. In addition, we ask the question
of when Muslim citizens will challenge legal constraints on political action in
Dutch society. To this end, we compare the effects of a salient religious identity
on normative (i.e., legal) and nonnormative (i.e., illegal) action forms. Finally, we
study for what purpose Muslim citizens will mobilize by varying the framing of
political action in terms of religious or, alternatively, ethnic or superordinate group
goals.
As the Netherlands were pioneering multicultural policies in North-Western
Europe in the early 1980s, major immigrant groups, including Moroccan and
Turkish immigrants and their offspring, were publicly recognized as ethnic mi-
norities; and special provisions and institutional arrangements were established—
including publicly funded Islamic schools and media. More recently, however, the
Dutch multicultural experiment has been largely discontinued in favor of more
assimilationist public policies. Moroccan and Turkish minority groups share sim-
ilar histories of labor migration, along with persistent ethnic disadvantage and
segregation (Dagevos & Gijsberts, 2007). At the same time, they differ in their
group position as Muslim minorities in Dutch society. As the most prototypi-
cal Muslim group in the Netherlands, Moroccan Muslims are less accepted and
more distrusted than Turkish Muslims (Phalet & Gijsberts, 2007). The claims
of Moroccan–Dutch Muslims on equal acceptance as fellow citizens are more
strongly rejected and, therefore, they experience most identity threat. Parallel
studies of Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims make it possible to
assess the impact of different group positions on levels and forms of political
action.
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Theory and Concepts
Recently, Klein, Spears, and Reicher (2007) introduced the notion of social
identity performance, which serves as a heuristic framework for our research.
This notion originates in the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) model
of deindividuation effects, which emphasizes the communicative dimension of
group behavior (Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995). Similar to sociological and
anthropological research traditions which have articulated the performative nature
of identity and ethnicity (Verkuyten, 2005), this model posits that social identities
depend crucially on acceptance and acknowledgment by relevant others. Since
identities are performed in interactions, others’ perceptions and expectations im-
pose constraints, which in turn can shape the situational contents and meanings
of social identities. Relevant audiences of social identity performance are in the
first place one’s fellow in-group members. Yet also members of other, often more
powerful, groups in society can be influential. Taking such a situational perspec-
tive on ethnic identity, Noels, Clement, and Leavitt (2010, in press), for instance,
show how one’s view of what other in-group and out-group members think of
oneself relates to one’s own ethnic identity and experiences of discrimination. In
the case of religious identity performance, one’s sense of Muslim identity does not
only depend on the acceptance by, and support from, other Muslims as in-group
members. It is also enabled or constrained by the way in which Muslims are de-
fined and treated in the wider society. For instance, wearing the headscarf is seen
by some Muslims as communicating their religious identity. Yet in some societal
contexts the headscarf is publicly disapproved, or even legally banned. From the
perspective of religious identity performance, such external constraints on reli-
gious group behavior will ultimately shape the meaning of being Muslim. In light
of the dual identity of Dutch Muslims as members of their religious community
and as citizens (Phalet & Kosic, 2006), the Dutch majority represents a powerful
“other.” Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing global “war on terror-
ism,” extensive media exposure and increased police surveillance of Muslims and
their religious activities have dramatically increased the psychological presence
and public visibility of Muslim and non-Muslim Dutch audiences.
The notion of religious identity performance includes not only group behavior
that specifically promotes a religious group project (i.e., identity mobilization),
but also group behavior that serves primarily to bolster religious group identity
(i.e., identity consolidation; Klein et al., 2007). Whereas identity consolidation
is conceived as creating the general capacity for group coordination, mobiliza-
tion directs coordinated action toward specific group goals (Haslam, 2001). In
this research, religious identity performance refers to the purposeful political ac-
tion of Muslim citizens as religious group members with a view to bolstering
their religious identity (consolidation) and/or promoting religious group goals in
Dutch society (mobilization). For Dutch Muslims, their religious identity is central
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to their self-understanding (Verkuyten, 2007). Moreover, these communities are
characterized by strong family and ethnic ties, which sustain and transmit religious
rules and practices to the next generation (Phalet, Gijsberts, & Hagendoorn, 2008).
In the eyes of the Dutch majority, however, the religious way of life of Muslims
is commonly seen as incompatible with civic norms and values in Dutch society
(Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). For Dutch Muslims, therefore, their peripheral
status as Muslim citizens in Dutch society poses a threat to their religious identity.
More precisely, in light of their dual identity as Muslims and citizens, religious
identity threat implies a tension between their subordinate group membership as
Muslims and their inclusion as citizens at the superordinate level of the wider
society (Jetten, Branscombe, & Spears, 2002; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). It
follows from the primary function of identity consolidation that Muslim citizens
should be especially motivated to engage in political action when they experience
religious identity threat.
Group Positions
Although Dutch Muslims are generally devalued and distrusted as the “en-
emy within,” the distinct group positions of Moroccan and Turkish Muslims imply
differential degrees of exposure to religious identity threat. In the Netherlands, Mo-
roccan Muslims are the prime target of anti-Islam feelings. The Turkish group is
less devalued than the Moroccan group in the Dutch ethnic hierarchy (Phalet &
Gijsberts, 2007). For instance, when using a feeling thermometer to indicate their
general feelings toward Turkish–Dutch and Moroccan–Dutch Muslims, Dutch-
majority group members evaluated the former group of Muslims more positively
than the latter (Verkuyten & Poppe, 2008). From their side, the Turkish–Dutch
were found to differentiate and distance themselves from the Moroccan–Dutch;
and this tendency toward “horizontal hostility” between Turkish and Moroccan mi-
nority groups (White & Langer, 1999) increased with growing opposition against
Islam in the Netherlands (Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). Compared to the Moroc-
can–Dutch, therefore, the Turkish–Dutch are a less prototypical and less-devalued
Muslim group in Dutch society, which also tends to distinguish itself from other
Muslim minorities.
Barreto, Spears, Ellemers, and Shahinper (2003) found that members of a
devalued immigrant group were more likely to stress their dual identity as ethnic
minority members and citizens when communicating with a majority group (rather
than an in-group) audience who questioned or denied their double-identity claims.
Interestingly, this audience effect was not found in a less-devalued immigrant
group, whose double-identity claims were less contested by the majority group.
In a similar vein, Dutch Muslims engaging in political action as Muslim citizens
can be seen as publicly asserting their religious and civic membership. To the
extent that the self-definition of Turkish–Dutch Muslims as both Muslims and
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citizens is less likely to be denied or rejected, they are less exposed to identity
threat than Moroccan Muslims. Hence, they should be less motivated to perform
their religious identity in the political domain. In contrast, in view of their more
peripheral position in the Dutch intergroup system, Moroccan Muslims should be
especially motivated to perform their religious identity.
To sum up, our main purpose is to examine whether the distinct group positions
of Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims influence when and how they
will take political action as Muslim citizens. To this end, two parallel survey
studies were conducted with community samples of self-identified Muslims of
Moroccan and Turkish immigrant origin in Rotterdam. In the following sections,
we derive specific hypotheses about the effects of religious identity salience, goal
framing, and normative constraints on political action in both Muslim groups.
Religious Identity Salience
With a view to inducing situational variation in the level of religious identity
threat, we manipulate the salience of the religious identity of Moroccan–Dutch
and Turkish–Dutch Muslims, relative to their ethnic identities. Minority groups
that face high levels of threat should be strongly motivated to act collectively for
the purpose of consolidating their threatened group identity (Klein et al., 2007).
Consequently, and because of the religious character of identity threat in the
Dutch intergroup context, the religious identity salience hypothesis predicts that
Moroccan–Dutch Muslims will be especially motivated to act together as Muslim
citizens when their religious (rather than ethnic) group identity is made salient.
In contrast, Turkish–Dutch Muslims, who experience lower levels of religious
identity threat in the Dutch intergroup system, should be less motivated to take
action under similar conditions of religious identity salience.
To test the impact of religious identity salience in both Muslim groups, a
between-subjects priming experiment was conducted in which participants were
assigned to situational contexts that accentuated either ethnic or religious cat-
egories. In priming religious (or ethnic) identity, our aim was not to decouple
religion and ethnicity, since these identity categories are not neatly partitioned in
social reality. Rather, making religious (vs. ethnic) identity salient foregrounds re-
ligion (vs. ethnicity) in one’s situational sense of self. Our focus on the contextual
salience of religious identity complements well-researched explanations of col-
lective action tendencies from stable individual differences in the degree of group
identification (Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006; Kawakami & Dion, 1993;
Simon et al., 1998; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000; Wright & Tropp, 2002). Overall,
these studies show that identification predicts collective action tendencies. In the
present research context, however, individual differences in degree of identifica-
tion are less informative. One reason is that within-group variance in religious
identification among Dutch Muslims is mostly restricted to the upper end of the
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scale, distinguishing (quasi-)total from nontotal Muslim identifiers (Verkuyten &
Yildiz, 2007). When religion becomes a major sociopolitical dividing line, as is
arguably the case in Dutch society, the importance and impact of intragroup dif-
ferences in religious group identification tend to decline, relative to the power of
the situation to activate religious categories and to define group behavior in reli-
gious terms. However, individual differences in Muslim identification also imply
differences in the readiness to use and respond to religious cues (Turner, Hogg,
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Therefore, we take individual differences in
group identification into account. This enables us to separate out a pure context
effect of religious identity salience on political activism.
Goal Framing
Looking beyond identity consolidation, the religious identity performance
of Dutch Muslims may also serve to promote specific group goals in the Dutch
intergroup context (Klein et al., 2007). In support of the role of goal framing in
identity mobilization, social movement research documents the impact of frame
alignment processes on movement participation (Snow, Rochford, Worden, &
Benford, 1986). Likewise, the ability of leaders as “entrepreneurs of identity” to
create relevant frames, which define self and social reality in a way that supports
political action, appears to be decisive for group success in sociopolitical struggles
(Klein & Licata, 2003; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). Together, these studies suggest
that coordinated action hinges upon the congruence of group goals with a relevant
group identity. Therefore, we expect that the specific contents of group goals are
a crucial moderator of the connection between group identity and political action.
Thus, an identity–goal congruence prediction can be made: the political action
tendencies of Muslim citizens will be most pronounced when the specific group
goal provides an optimal fit with the salient religious identity. To examine the role
of identity–goal congruence, a goal-framing experiment manipulated the purpose
of political action by varying the contents of the group goals. Using a between-
subjects design, religious group goals (“defend Islam”) are contrasted with ethnic
group goals (“help the Turkish or Moroccan homeland”) at the subgroup level
and with human rights goals (“protect human rights”) at the superordinate level.
The experiment adds to existing research on the association of social identity
with collective action, which usually predicts general action tendencies without
specifying the purpose of political action (cf. supra).
In combination with the priming experiment, the goal-framing experiment
allows more precise predictions as to when and how a salient religious identity
enables political action. Jointly, the two between-subjects experiments investigate
the mobilizing force of distinct religious, ethnic, and superordinate group goals
under conditions of religious identity salience. Specifically, religious and ethnic
group goals accentuate distinct categories at the subgroup level, whereas human
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rights goals reach beyond ethnic or religious subgroups by focusing on a super-
ordinate category. Both ethnic and religious goals stress in different ways the
distinctiveness of Muslim citizens as minority group members, whereas superor-
dinate goals foreground what they have in common with non-Muslim citizens.
While human rights goals are also congruent with religious group norms, they dif-
fer from religious goals in that they deemphasize the distinctiveness of Muslims
in favor of the common humanity of all citizens. From the perspective of identity
mobilization, Dutch Muslim citizens might opt to deemphasize distinct and pos-
sibly threatening aspects of their religion under conditions of religious identity
salience, to gain trust or to avoid opposition from the majority of non-Muslim
Dutch citizens (Klein & Licata, 2003).
The experimental design allows us to examine different strategies to achieve
identity–goal congruence: Dutch Muslims may mobilize for distinctive religious
goals and/or inclusive civic goals when their Muslim identity is made salient.
More generally, religious group norms can be, and have been used to mobilize
Muslims for very different political projects depending on the sociopolitical con-
text (Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002). As seen from the perspective of identity
mobilization, the goal framing of political action takes into account social-reality
constraints on identity performance. Since the specific social realities of Moroc-
can–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims entail different constraints on the public
performance of their Muslim identity, what represents optimal identity–goal con-
gruence under similar conditions of religious identity salience may differ between
both groups. Accordingly, we expected that the Moroccan–Dutch Muslims, who
face high religious identity threat, will be most motivated to take political action
when their Muslim identity is made salient and when the action is framed in terms
of distinctive religious goals. In contrast, Turkish–Dutch Muslims whose group
position in Dutch society is less peripheral, may be more likely to mobilize when
political action is framed in terms of inclusive human rights goals.
Normative Constraints
A final aim of this research is to explore the moderating role of legal con-
straints on political action in Dutch society. In other words, does religious identity
salience increase the willingness of Muslim citizens to take nonnormative (i.e.,
punishable) action? Documenting the strategic side of identity performance, re-
search on deindividuation has shown that group members take into account the
risk of punishment when publicly affirming their group identity in front of pow-
erful groups in society (Reicher & Levine, 1994). At the same time, the need for
in-group respect and the presence of in-group support can motivate and empower
minority group members to openly challenge the norms of powerful groups (Re-
icher, Levine, & Gordijn, 1998; Simon & Stu¨rmer, 2003). The double membership
of Dutch Muslims as Muslims and citizens implies the psychological presence of
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both the Muslim in-group and the Dutch-majority group as relevant audiences.
This raises the question of whether and when Muslim citizens will openly chal-
lenge Dutch civic norms. To investigate this question, a within-subject design is
used, presenting legal and illegal forms of political action in random order to all
participants. We expected that Moroccan–Dutch Muslims, who are most exposed
to religious identity threat, will be more likely to challenge Dutch civic norms




Two parallel studies were conducted in Rotterdam. The studies were intro-
duced as surveys of the experiences and opinions of inhabitants of Rotterdam with
regard to cultural diversity and equal opportunities in the city. Participants were
visited at home and took part in computer-assisted personal interviews with trained
co-ethnic and multilingual interviewers. Questionnaires were bilingual, allowing
interviewers to switch between Dutch and Moroccan–Arab or Turkish language
screens. Interviewers showed a badge of Utrecht University when introducing the
research. Ensuring the ecological validity of the research, the interview situation
thus implied the simultaneous psychological presence and mutual visibility of
both Muslim and Dutch audiences.
In Study 1, 544 Moroccan–Dutch and in Study 2, 640 Turkish–Dutch adults
who self-identified as Muslims (over 98%) were randomly sampled from the
commune register of Rotterdam on the basis of ethnic ancestry. Only cases with
sufficient nonmissing values were included in the analyses (i.e., 521 in Study 1
and 625 in Study 2). For cases with few missing values, maximum likelihood
estimation was used to impute estimates for missing values (Allison, 2001).
Interviews were taken in the language of choice of the participant (9% used
mostly Moroccan–Arab, 70% mostly Dutch, and 21% Dutch with oral Berber
translation in Study 1; in Study 2, 32% used mostly Turkish and 68% mostly
Dutch). About one in two participants were women (42% in both studies). Partic-
ipants were between 20 and 72 years of age (M = 32, SD = 10.9 in Study 1 and
M = 32, SD = 11.3 in Study 2). A minority (17% in Study 1 and 22% in Study
2) was born in the Netherlands or migrated before the age of six (15% in Study
1 and 13% in Study 2). A total of 47% of the Moroccan–Dutch and 61% of the
Turkish–Dutch sample had Dutch citizenship. Most of the foreign nationals (81%
and 63%, respectively) intended to apply for citizenship status in the near future.
Both groups were similarly low educated: 59% of the Moroccan and 56% of the
Turkish sample had only a high school diploma or less.
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Materials and Procedure
The dependent measures in both studies were adapted from the Dutch electoral
surveys to assess political action tendencies. Participants were told that citizens
who do not agree with the way things are going in society, can use several action
means to express their opinion or to exert pressure. They were asked to indicate
whether they themselves would be willing to take a number of actions on a 3-
point scale from (1) certainly not over (2) possibly to (3) certainly. Note that
this measure directly asks about behavioral intentions, as distinct from commonly
used measures of public support for political action. As part of the measurement
of political action tendencies, a goal-framing experiment was introduced. In a
between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to three conditions,
so that they indicated their willingness to take action with regard to one out of
three goal types. Specifically, political action was framed in terms of either ethnic
(“help Morocco or Turkey”; n = 165 in Study 1 and 195 in Study 2), or religious
(defend Islam; n = 180 in Study 1 and 216 in Study 2), or superordinate group
goals (protect human rights; n = 176 in Study 1 and 214 in Study 2). In each
condition, the interviewer read up a short list of legal actions (i.e., sign a petition,
donate money, and take part in a demonstration) as well as illegal actions (i.e., use
street violence, and damage property), which appeared on the screen in random
order to avoid order effects ( = .73 in Study 1 and .74 in Study 2). Legal and
illegal actions formed two reliable and moderately related factors in confirmatory
factor analysis, labeled “normative” and “nonnormative action.” On average, both
groups were quite willing to take normative political action (M = 2.4, SD = .59
in Study 1; M = 2.11, SD = .66 in Study 2) and rather reluctant to engage in
nonnormative action (M = 1.3, SD = .53; M = 1.24, SD = .49). Combining goal
types as between-subjects variables and action forms as within-subject variables,
the assessment of political action distinguishes between (three by two is) six modes
of political mobilization. Thus, participants in the ethnic condition of the goal-
framing experiment indicated whether they would, for example, donate money or
violate private property for the purpose of helping their homeland; participants in
the religious condition were asked whether they would donate or violate property
to defend Islam; and those in the superordinate condition whether they would
donate or violate property to protect human rights.
Immediately preceding the political module of the interview questionnaire,
the identity module posed a series of questions about group identity and intergroup
relations. In a randomized between-subjects design, about half of the participants
(n = 252 in Study 1 and 315 in Study 2) answered the same series of questions
with reference to their ethnic identity as Moroccans or Turks; the other half
(n = 269 in Study 1 and 310 in Study 2) answered exactly the same questions with
regard to their religious identity as Muslims. As part of the identity module, five
items measured (on 5-point scales) participants’ self-identification as Moroccans
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or Turks in the ethnic priming condition and as Muslims in the religious priming
condition. This measure was included in the analyses to separate out situational
variation in ethnic or religious identity salience from individual differences in
ethnic or religious self-identification. The five items have been used in previous
research with ethnic minorities in the Netherlands (Verkuyten, 2005) and they
yielded reliable scales for ethnic ( = .68 in Study 1 and .70 in Study 2) and
religious identification ( = .81 in both studies). On average, Moroccan Muslims
identified strongly as Moroccans (M = 3.7, SD = .70) and very strongly as
Muslims (M = 4.0, SD = .77). Similarly, Turkish Muslims identified strongly
as Turks (M = 3.6, SD = .76) and as Muslims (M = 3.6, SD = .89). Education
(0: up to lower secondary level in Morocco or full secondary in the Netherlands;
1: higher levels) and gender (0: women; 1: men) were also included as control
variables. Age, migration generation, and citizenship status were not included in
the analyses, since they did not affect political action tendencies.
Data Analysis
Structural equation modeling was used to estimate causal models with mean
structures in multiple groups (Kline, 2005). Separate models were tested for Mo-
roccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims. An integrative four-group model
with both priming conditions in both samples was also estimated. However, sep-
arate Moroccan and Turkish models were more straightforward, both statistically
and interpretively. To test the effects of religious identity salience, ethnic and
religious priming conditions were specified as comparison groups: participants
who answered the questions with regard to their ethnic identity in group 1, and
those who answered the same questions with reference to religion in group 2. The
following causal models were estimated simultaneously across priming conditions
(see Tables 1 and 2). On the dependent side, normative and nonnormative forms
of political action were distinguished. Both action forms were defined at the latent
level to correct regression coefficients for unreliability in the dependent measures.
On the independent side, the goal framing of political action was specified as
fixed effects of two dummy variables for religious and superordinate goal types
(vs. ethnic goals as a reference category). In addition, degree of identification
was specified at the latent level, measuring ethnic identification in group 1 and
religious identification in group 2. Education and gender were added as control
variables.
For model modification, comparison, and evaluation, formal indices of global
and local fit were complemented with conventional fit indices (Hu & Bentler,
1999): good fit if  2/df < 2, the comparative fit index CFI > .90 and the root mean
squared error of approximation RMSEA <.05. The  2-difference test was used
for model comparison: a modified model was selected when setting a parameter
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Table 1. Final Causal Model of Political Mobilization for Moroccan – Dutch Muslims: Parameter
Estimates for Slopes, Intercepts, and Means in Religious (vs. Ethnic) Priming Condition
Ethnic Identity Religious Identity Ethnic Identity Religious Identity
Priming Priming Priming Priming
Slopes for normative action Slopes for nonnormative action
Education .15 (.05)∗∗A .15 (.05)∗∗A 0 0
Gender .37 (.05)∗∗B .37 (.05)∗∗B 0 0
Religious goals .08 (.07) .16 (.07)∗ 0 0
Human rights goals 0 0 0 0
Identification 0 0 −.03 (.05) −.22 (.06)∗∗
Latent means and intercepts
Identification 0 .33 (.08)∗∗
Normative action 0 0
Nonnormative action 0 .14 (.05)∗∗
Note. Same capital letters indicate equality constraints across priming conditions. Effect parameters
are unstandardized coefficients b.
Standard errors are between parentheses.
Model fit:  2(155) = 225.25; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .03;  2(13) = 18.35 (p = .15).∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01.
Table 2. Final Causal Model of Political Mobilization for Turkish – Dutch Muslims: Parameter
Estimates for Slopes, Intercepts, and Means in Religious (vs. Ethnic) Priming Condition
Ethnic Identity Religious Identity Ethnic Identity Religious Identity
Priming Priming Priming Priming
Slopes for normative action Slopes for nonnormative action
Education .14 (.06)∗∗A .14 (.06)∗∗A 0 0
Gender .29 (.06)∗∗B .29 (.06)∗∗B 13 (.06)∗ .25 (.06)∗∗
Religious goals 0 0 0 0
Human rights goals .01 (.08) .31 (.08)∗∗ −.13 (.05)∗∗D −.13 (.05)∗∗D
Identification .27 (.05)∗∗C .27 (.05)∗∗C .13 (.04)∗E .13 (.04)∗E
Latent means and intercepts
Identification 0 0
Normative action 0 −.16 (.07)∗
Nonnormative action 0 0
Note. Same capital letters indicate equality constraints across priming conditions Effect parameters
are unstandardized coefficients b.
Standard errors are between parentheses.
Model fit:  2(152) = 270.27; RMSEA = .04; CFI = .94;  2 (17) = 19.26 (p = .31).∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01.
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free (i.e., decrease in df ) significantly improved local or global model fit, or when
constraining a parameter (i.e., increase in df ) did not affect the fit.
Following a stepwise approach, common measurement models and causal
models were specified across priming conditions. Next, increasingly restrictive
equality constraints were imposed on (co-)variances, means and intercepts, and
slopes in a stepwise fashion. In particular, to test main effects of religious (vs.
ethnic) identity priming on political action, equality constraints were imposed on
the intercepts of normative and nonnormative action across priming conditions. In
addition, to test interactions with goal framing, equality constraints were imposed
on the slopes of goal type effects across ethnic and religious priming conditions.
In the presence of significant main or interaction effects of priming, equality
constraints on intercepts or slopes are rejected on the basis of a significantly worse
fit relative to the baseline model ( 2 test).
Results and Discussion
Study 1: Moroccan–Dutch Muslims
Because Moroccan–Dutch Muslims face relatively high levels of identity
threat, it was expected that under identity-threatening circumstances, they would
be motivated to act together as group members and to assert their religious identity
in opposition to the dominant majority. Thus, when the situational context makes
their threatened Muslim identity salient, we expected more readiness for norma-
tive action when religious group goals are involved (identity–goal congruence
hypothesis), as well as a generally increased readiness for nonnormative action.
In the best fitting measurement model,  2(74) = 100.90, p = .02, RMSEA =
.03, CFI = .97;  2(11) = 12.05, p = .36), all loadings for ethnic and religious
identification were invariant, as well as two out of five intercepts. A negative
error covariance was allowed between two indicators of ethnic identification.
Mean levels of ethnic and religious identification differed significantly, so that
participants were even more strongly identified as Muslims than as Moroccans
(M = .33, p < .001). Overall, both normative and nonnormative political action
were fully equivalent across priming conditions, whereas the ethnic and religious
identification measures were structurally equivalent (Van de Vijver, & Leung,
1997).
The final causal model had a good global fit (see Table 1). All variances
could be set equal across experimental conditions, as well as a residual covariance
between normative and nonnormative action forms (r = .39; p < .001). As a most
rigorous test of religious identity salience and identity–goal congruence, intercepts
and slopes were set equal across ethnic and religious priming conditions. In line
with the expected interaction of identity priming with goal framing, Moroccan–
Dutch Muslims were most willing to engage in normative action when their
Political Mobilization of Dutch Muslims 771
Muslim identity was made salient and when the action served the cause of Islam.
In addition, across priming conditions, more highly educated Moroccans and men
were more willing to take normative action than less educated Moroccans and
women.
With regard to nonnormative action, we found a significant main effect of
religious identity priming. As expected, Moroccan–Dutch Muslims were less re-
luctant to engage in nonnormative action when their threatened identity as Muslims
was made salient. In addition, a negative interaction effect of religious identity
priming with degree of identification was also found. Apparently, a quasi-total reli-
gious identification protects Moroccan–Dutch Muslims from engaging in violent
or disruptive behavior. Overall, the model explained most variance in normative
action tendencies (2 = .12 for ethnic and .14 for religious priming). Only in the
religious priming condition, the model explained some variance in nonnormative
action (2 = .10), thanks to the buffering effect of religious identification. The
model did not explain nonnormative action in the ethnic priming condition (2 =
.01).
The results of Study 1 show that the willingness of Moroccan–Dutch Mus-
lims to take political action varied depending on the situational salience of their
threatened Muslim identity. In the normative domain, the pattern of findings (i.e.,
invariant intercepts and differential slopes of religious vs. ethnic goal type effects)
is in line with the identity–goal congruence hypothesis. Thus, under conditions
of religious (vs. ethnic) identity salience, Moroccan–Dutch Muslims are more
willing to donate money, sign petitions, or demonstrate for the purpose of de-
fending Islam. This finding supports the explanatory role of the congruence of a
salient group identity with a specific political project in predicting when group
members will engage in collective action. In the nonnormative domain of political
action, a distinct pattern of findings (i.e., differential intercepts and zero slopes of
goal type effects) was in accordance with the religious identity salience hypothe-
sis. Thus, Moroccan–Dutch citizens were more willing to take action when their
Muslim identity was primed, even when the action involved punishable behavior.
As expected from the primary function of identity consolidation, the salience of
a threatened religious identity seems to motivate Moroccan–Dutch citizens to
publicly assert their Muslim identity. Moreover, the nonnormative nature of polit-
ical action, like engaging in street violence or violating private property, suggests
an increased willingness of Moroccan–Dutch citizens to resist Dutch civic norms
when their Muslim identity is made salient. In the absence of framing effects, non-
normative action can be viewed as an undifferentiated reaction to identity threat,
which does not articulate a specific political project. Apparently, nonnormative
action reflects a general tendency to challenge the Dutch majority by publicly
engaging in punishable behavior.
Somewhat surprisingly, these kinds of actions appear to be most likely among
Moroccan Dutch with a relatively weak Muslim identification. This result goes
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against common findings of a positive association of group identification with
political action tendencies. Importantly, it also qualifies popular perceptions of
so-called Muslim radicals as particularly prone to using violence. In view of
generally high levels of religious identification among Moroccan–Dutch Muslims,
one possible explanation is that a quasi-total Muslim identification implies higher
levels of conformity to religious group norms, which generally oppose disruptive
or violent behavior. Moreover, as quasi-total Muslims are trying to live up to the
ideal of a good Muslim, their norm-congruent behavior is supported by fellow
believers with whom they form a strong moral community (Almond, Appleby, &
Sivan, 2003; Herriot, 2007). Religious identity salience may function as a reminder
of religious norms of sociomoral behavior, which preclude nonnormative action
regardless of the cause it might serve. Another possibility is that relatively weak
Muslim identifiers feel less secure in their religious identity, and hence are less
reluctant to engage in nonnormative action when religion is made salient. For
them, religious identity salience may induce a need to assert their loyalty as
Muslims, even at the risk of incurring legal sanctions. Indeed, the fear of not being
accepted or respected by fellow in-group members has been found to motivate the
aggressive assertion of an insecure group identity toward the outside world (Noel,
Wann, & Branscombe, 1995).
Study 2: Turkish–Dutch Muslims
The results of Study 1 with Moroccan–Dutch Muslims are in line with ex-
pectations from religious identity threat. Study 2 replicates the first study with
Turkish–Dutch Muslims, who have a less peripheral position in Dutch society.
If religious identity threat is indeed driving the political activism of Dutch Mus-
lims, Turkish Muslims should be rather weakly motivated to take action when
their Muslim identity is made salient (religious identity salience hypothesis).
More specifically, they should be most likely to engage in normative action when
superordinate goals emphasize the common cause of all citizens (identity–goal
congruence hypothesis).
Study 2 replicates the same partially equivalent measurement model with a
good fit:  2(73) = 117.33, p < .001, RMSEA = .04, CFI = .94;  2(11) =
7.78, p = .73. Measures of normative and nonnormative political action were fully
equivalent, and of ethnic and religious identification were partially equivalent
across priming conditions. Different from the previous study, mean levels of
ethnic and religious identification did not differ between conditions.
The final causal model had also a good global fit (see Table 2). All variances
could be set equal, as well as the covariance between normative and nonnormative
action (r = .35; p < .001). As a rigorous test of the role of religious identity
salience and identity–goal congruence, equality constraints were imposed on in-
tercepts and slopes across priming conditions. In the normative domain of political
Political Mobilization of Dutch Muslims 773
action, Turkish–Dutch Muslims were less willing to mobilize under conditions
of religious identity salience. This negative main effect was qualified by the ex-
pected interaction of religious identity priming with goal framing. Turkish–Dutch
Muslims were generally less mobilized as Muslim citizens, except when political
action was framed at the superordinate level of human rights goals. In addition,
a negative effect of human rights goals on nonnormative action did not differ
between priming conditions. Apparently, superordinate goals also served as a
buffer against nonnormative action tendencies. Furthermore, Turkish–Dutch cit-
izens who more strongly identified with their ethnic or religious in-group were
more willing to take action, especially in the normative domain. Men mobilized
more than women for both normative and nonnormative action. Higher education
predicted normative action only. Like the effects of degree of identification, edu-
cation and gender effects on political mobilization were invariant across priming
conditions, except for a differential gender effect on nonnormative action: only
Turkish–Dutch women were (even) more unlikely to challenge civic norms when
their Muslim identity was made salient. The model explained most variance in
normative action (2 = .12 in the ethnic and .16 in the religious priming condition).
Effect sizes were smaller for nonnormative action (2 = .05 in the ethnic and .07
in the religious priming condition).
To summarize, Study 2 shows that the contextual salience of a religious (vs.
ethnic) group identity affects the willingness of Turkish–Dutch Muslims to take
political action. Moreover, in support of the moderating role of goal framing,
we find that the impact of a salient religious identity depends on the specific
goals of political action. In addition, the impact of religious identity salience
was mostly restricted to the normative domain. In comparison with Study 1, the
findings in the normative domain (i.e., varying intercepts and varying slopes for
a superordinate vs. ethnic goal type effect) suggest a distinct Turkish variant of
identity–goal congruence. Generally, Turkish minority members were less likely
to take political action when their religious (vs. ethnic) identity was made salient.
This result is not due to a lower importance attached to their religious identity,
as levels of identification with ethnic and religious group categories were similar.
Moreover, individual differences in ethnic and religious group identification were
similarly related to political action, so that more highly identified Turkish Muslims
were more active regardless of the ethnic or religious contents of identity. To better
understand the demobilizing effect of religious identity salience, it is essential to
take into account the goal framing of political action. In particular, demobilization
was counteracted by a unique mobilizing effect of superordinate human rights
goals under the condition of religious identity salience. When expressing their
willingness to engage in political action as Muslim citizens, the Turkish–Dutch
appear to be especially motivated to promote higher-order human rights goals. Like
religious goals, human rights goals make a strong moral appeal that is congruent
with religious group norms. At the same time, they differ from religious group
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goals because they deemphasize the distinctiveness of Muslims in favor of the
common humanity of all citizens. Thus, the framing of political action in terms
of human rights goals foregrounds what Muslim citizens have in common with
the majority of non-Muslim Dutch citizens. This suggests that Turkish–Dutch
Muslims respond to religious identity threat by deemphasizing their distinctiveness
as Muslims from the Dutch majority. This is in line with a strategic side of
identity mobilization and with the findings of Klein and Licata (2003). In this way,
minority groups can try to avoid antagonizing more powerful groups who might
otherwise impede group success. In the case of Turkish–Dutch Muslims, religious
identity salience may induce a special need to be recognized as a less prototypical
subgroup within the wider and generally devalued category of Dutch Muslims.
When reminded of their Muslim identity, they may be especially motivated to
seek acceptance by the Dutch majority as worthy Muslim citizens, in contrast
with Moroccan–Dutch Muslims whose claims to equal acceptance as citizens are
less convincing.
Outside the normative domain of political action, our findings (i.e., invariant
intercepts and slopes) show that Turkish Muslims were neither more nor less
willing to engage in violent or disruptive action when their Muslim identity was
made salient. This is in line with the expectation that Turkish–Dutch Muslims
will be less motivated to perform their religious identity, because they are less
susceptible to religious identity threat. It also turned out that nonnormative protest
is especially unlikely when political action is framed in terms of superordinate
human rights goals. This finding tallies with our understanding of human rights
mobilization among Turkish–Dutch Muslims as oriented toward acceptance by
the Dutch-majority group as worthy and law-abiding citizens.
General Discussion
Against the backdrop of what some commentators have called an ongoing
“Dutch–Muslim cultural war” (Scroggins, 2005), we asked the question of when
and for what purpose Dutch Muslims will act together as Muslim citizens. Using
the notion of religious identity performance as a heuristic framework (Klein et al.,
2007), parallel studies examined political action tendencies among Moroccan–
Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims. These groups are differentially devalued in
Dutch society, so that Moroccan Muslims face higher levels of identity threat
than Turkish Muslims. The studies varied the situational salience of Muslim
identity in comparison with an ethnic definition of group identity. In line with
the idea of identity consolidation, and in view of the religious nature of identity
threat in the Dutch intergroup context, the religious identity salience hypothesis
predicted that especially Moroccan–Dutch Muslims would be more willing to act
together as Muslim citizens when their threatened religious identity is made salient.
Going beyond general measures of collective action tendencies, the research also
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examined the role of goal framing in the political mobilization of Muslim identity.
The identity–goal congruence hypothesis predicted that Dutch Muslims would be
specifically motivated to promote group goals that are congruent with a salient
religious identity. Finally, to test the moderating role of normative constraints, the
studies included normative and nonnormative action forms.
In the normative domain of political action, we found different variants of
identity–goal congruence for Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims. In
the Moroccan–Dutch group, the mobilizing effect of religious identity salience
was restricted to the promotion of religious group goals. In contrast, it was the
promotion of superordinate goals that enabled the Turkish Dutch to mobilize
as Muslim citizens. Whereas Moroccan–Dutch Muslims appear to respond to
religious identity threat by publicly expressing their special commitment to Islam
as a distinctive identity and political project, the less-devalued Turkish–Dutch
Muslims respond to religious identity threat by withdrawing from the political
scene when they are called upon to defend Islam, or by rallying in support of
human rights as a political project that appeals to their more general moral concerns
as citizens. In the nonnormative domain, a general mobilizing effect of religious
identity salience was found for Moroccan–Dutch Muslims. They were more ready
to engage in disruptive action when their Muslim identity was made salient. Since
nonnormative mobilization did not depend on goal framing, this finding suggests
a general willingness to resist Dutch civic norms as a reaction against religious
identity threat. Among Turkish–Dutch Muslims, we did not find a similar spillover
effect of religious identity threat into nonnormative action, as salience effects
were mostly restricted to the normative domain (except for a differential gender
effect). Taken together, the two studies show that different group positions within
a larger and generally devalued category of Dutch Muslims affect the willingness
of Moroccan and Turkish Muslims to take political action as Muslim citizens.
Moreover, both groups tend to support qualitatively different political projects.
Looking beyond distinct patterns of mobilization, the findings demonstrate
the impact of a salient Muslim identity on the political mobilization of Dutch
Muslims. Importantly, both Moroccan and Turkish Dutch strongly identified as
Muslims, so that the average degree of religious identification was equally high
or slightly higher relative to the degree of ethnic identification. Over and above
very high levels of group identification and public visibility in the Dutch context,
however, the relative situational salience of their Muslim identity made a signifi-
cant difference in the political mobilization of Dutch Muslims. This research goes
beyond previous studies of group identification and collective action in a number
of ways. First, it identifies more precisely the role of religious identity by varying
its contextual salience relative to ethnicity. The priming effects supplement earlier
findings relating collective action to individual differences in group identification.
As religion is becoming a major sociopolitical divide in many western soci-
eties, more situations will make religious identities salient and may thus instigate
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political activism even among less strongly identified Muslims. Second, the re-
search demonstrates the interaction of religious identity with specific ethnic, re-
ligious, and superordinate group goals by varying the goal framing of political
action. Third, the results corroborate a normative distinction between legal and
illegal action forms. Most importantly, qualitatively different patterns of religious
identity performance among Moroccan–Dutch and Turkish–Dutch Muslims attest
to the significance of differential group positions within the wider and generally
devalued category of Muslims. While differential group positions are specific in
the Dutch context, the research has considerable societal relevance beyond the
Dutch case. Importantly, the findings problematize the amalgamation of distinct
ethnic minorities and they challenge the commonsense idea of an inherent conflict
of Islam with civic norms in liberal democracies.
As this research is covering new empirical ground, our findings lay the ground
for further research. The main focus of the present work was on the situational
salience of religious identity. Future research should combine a situational ap-
proach with more refined measures of individual differences in religious identifi-
cation. By distinguishing multiple components of identity, and/or by articulating
the specific contents of identity at the intersections of religion with ethnicity and
citizenship, such measures should throw more light on mixed findings of posi-
tive, zero, or negative associations with political action. In addition, future studies
should further develop the empirical basis for distinct consolidation and mobiliza-
tion functions of religious identity performance. Thus, there is room for alternative
manipulations or measures of identity threat as a crucial moderator; and there is
a need to better understand the impact of mutually visible minority and majority
audiences on the dual identity claims of immigrant minorities. Finally, the com-
parative approach from different group positions of Muslims should be extended
beyond the Dutch context. Thus, more research is needed on the political impact
of an emerging European Turkish identity as an alternative superordinate cate-
gory, which is not open to Moroccans as non-European Muslims. Looking beyond
Europe, comparative studies in other intergroup settings should contextualize fur-
ther the various ways in which religion plays out in the political domain, ranging
from disruptive or violent protest, over democratic forms of civic engagement, to
demobilization or disengagement.
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